El conocimiento como una actividad colectiva

Ángeles Eraña, Axel Arturo Barceló Aspeitia

Resumen


En este ensayo exploramos una perspectiva epistemológica en la que el elemento social y colectivo del conocimiento juega un papel fundamental en la explicación de su producción y transmisión. Primero presentamos y criticamos una posición individualista que ha sido dominante en la epistemología contemporánea y cuyas raíces pueden trazarse, al menos, hasta Descartes. Posteriormente introducimos y defendemos nuestra propia mirada, una en la que el conocimiento es un proceso constituido por un conjunto de actividades y prácticas que tiene un carácter material.

 


Palabras clave


conocimiento; epistemología; colectividad; materialidad; objetividad; actitud intencional

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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i0.746

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