EARLY AQUINAS ON MATTER

NOTES ON THE RECEIPTION OF THE ARISTOTELIAN CORPUS IN THE 13TH CENTURY

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Abstract
In his commentary on the second book of Peter Lombard’s Sentences, Aquinas deals with matter from different viewpoints. In this paper, some relevant texts from his Commentary on the distinctions 3, 12, and 18 are analyzed with a threefold aim. First, early Aquinas’ doctrine of matter is illustrated, with particular attention to its physical and metaphysical implications. Second, Aquinas’ theses are traced back to his Peripatetic sources, in order to show the crucial role played by Avicenna and Averroes in his rethinking of Aristotelian physics and metaphysics. Third, Aquinas’ thought is put into the context of the debate on matter arisen since the reception of Latin Aristotle’s Physics and Metaphysics. From these threefold perspective, the consistency and originality of early Aquinas’ doctrine can be appreciated.

Key words: matter, Aquinas, Latin Aristotle, physics, metaphysics.

Resumen
En su comentario al Segundo libro de las Sentencias de Pedro Lombardo, Tomás de Aquino enfrenta el problema de la materia desde distintos puntos de vista. En este artículo, algunos textos relevantes del Comentario sobre las distinciones 3, 12 y 18 son analizados con un triple propósito. En primer lugar, se presenta...
la perspectiva temprana de Tomás de Aquino sobre la materia, con particular atención a sus implicaciones físicas y metafísicas. En segundo lugar, las tesis del Aquinate son rastreadas hasta sus raíces peripatéticas, con la finalidad de mostrar el papel crucial que juegan Avicena y Averroes en su replanteamiento de la física y metafísica aristotélicas. En tercer lugar, el pensamiento de Tomás de Aquino es puesto en el contexto del debate sobre la materia que surgió desde la recepción de la Física y la Metafísica del Aristóteles latino. Desde esta triple perspectiva, se puede apreciar la consistencia y originalidad de la propuesta temprana de Tomás de Aquino sobre la materia.

Palabras clave: materia, Tomás de Aquino, Aristóteles latino, física, metafísica.

Although his approach to the topic is never strictly monographic, in his earlier writings Aquinas deals with matter more than once, and in quite different contexts: not only in his first opuscula —especially in De principiis naturae—, but also in his commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences. It is a selection of these passages that I intend to review here, and this with a threefold aim. First, I intend to make some doctrinal points concerning the way in which Aquinas conceives of matter. Second, I would like to look at some of Aquinas’ major sources in order to highlight the extent to which his understanding of matter is grounded in the thought of Aristotle, Avicenna, and Averroes respectively. This will also provide scope for some historical remarks about the assimilation of Aristotle’s Physics and Metaphysics in the Latin West. Third, I would like to put Aquinas’ discourse in an extra-Thomistic context, in order to suggest that it cannot be fully appreciated irrespective of both some theological works of his time, and the first Latin commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics and Metaphysics.

My paper is divided into three parts. After an outline of 13th-century doctrines of matter (§1) and some brief remarks about the doctrine of matter in De principiis naturae (§2.1), I shall focus on four early texts of Aquinas (§2.2). My analysis will concern both their contents and sources. By this means, I hope to shed light on some of early Aquinas’ philosophical options as well as some nuances of his early metaphysics, and this to offer a corrective to the common scholarly tendency to
overlook development in his thought. Finally, I will reassess the way in which Aquinas stands in relation to his Arabic sources and to his contemporaries concerning the question of matter (§3).

1. The debate on matter around the mid-13th century

1.1 In her book on Albert the Great’s doctrine of matter, Anna Rodolfi describes the topic of matter as “a transitional topic”, on which the interests of both theologians and philosophers converge with increasing frequency\(^1\). In fact, as exegetes respectively of Genesis\(^2\) and of the Aristotelian corpus, both theologians and philosophers were supposed to approach the issue of matter from an inside perspective. What is more, intersections between the two fields became less and less rare. Indeed, if the recourse to the tools of philosophy is not uncommon among theologians in exegetical writings, it is mostly in philosophical works that theological concerns emerge, as philosophers attempted to make Aristotle theologically orthodox as well as philosophically consistent.

In the first half of the 13th century, the issue of matter is taken up in various kinds of texts. First among these is hexaemeral literature. A well-known example is Grosseteste’s *Hexaëmeron*, composed in the first half of the 1230s, at about the time when he was also collecting his notes on Aristotle’s *Physics*\(^3\). Yet, despite the presence of some philosophical cues, in this work the topic is not systematically problematized, since the author’s focus remains strictly exegetical\(^4\).

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\(^2\) Genesis 1, 1-2, is commonly taken as describing the creation by God of “formless and empty” matter.


Something different emerges from the commentaries on the Sentences of the 1230s and 1240s. In fact, Peter Lombard not only hints at matter and the (im)materiality of creatures in different contexts of Book II of the Sentences\(^5\), but he devotes distinctions 12-15 entirely to the Genesis account of creation. While the brief questions on matter drawn from the tradition of Alexander of Hales’ Glossa\(^6\) are in all likelihood spurious\(^7\), in Albert’s commentary the issue is sometimes approached philosophically. Still, Albert’s interest in this topic is markedly different from Aquinas’. For instance, unlike Aquinas, when commenting on the first part of Book II of the Sentences, Albert raises no questions specifically dealing with celestial matter\(^8\).

Another relevant literary genre is that of theological summae\(^9\). Once again, Albert is of considerable interest\(^10\). In fact, by contrast with his commentary on Sentences, in the first part of his Summa de creaturis — where he is supposed to approach the question of coevals and their

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\(^7\) Ibid., p. 128*.

\(^8\) Albert the Great: Commentarii in II Sententiarum, ed. Augustus Borgnet, Paris: Vivès 1894 (Opera omnia, t. 27), d. 1, a. 3, 4, 11; d. 2, a. 2; d. 3, a. 4; d. 12, a. 1, 2; d. 18, a. 7.

\(^9\) Despite their structural differences, to this category also belong William of Auxerre’s Summa Aurea (I. II, tr. 8), William of Auvergne’s Magisterium divinale et sapientiale (especially De universo, ch. 29-34), and the Summa Fratris Alexandri (I. II, inq. 3).

origin from a mainly theological and exegetical perspective\textsuperscript{11}, Albert broadens his scope: he engages in some strictly philosophical questions, altogether comparable to the ones put forward by commentators on Aristotle. Such is the case in his treatments of matter\textsuperscript{12}. He first discusses its existence and essence (a. 1-2), then its origin (a. 3) and ontological structure (a. 4). Furthermore, he is concerned with an extensional issue, namely whether all creatures, \textit{qua} created, are material (a. 5). Finally, he focuses on the intention of matter, in order to establish how many kinds of (first) matter there are (a. 6-8) — a question on which he will expand later on, when dealing specifically with the third coeval\textsuperscript{13}.

Concerning the philosophical production, two literary genres are involved. In fact, questions on matter are raised both in commentaries on Aristotle — such as Rufus’, Roger Bacon’s, and Adam of Buckfield’s —, and in autonomous treatises — for instance Robert Kilwardby’s \textit{De Ortu
scientiarum (around 1250)\textsuperscript{14}, whose interests\textsuperscript{15} turn out to be quite similar to Albert’s in the \textit{Summa creaturis}.

About the earlier commentary tradition, a few preliminary remarks are required, mainly concerning the number and sections of commentaries at stake. To begin, some key Aristotelian loci dealing with matter must be identified. It so happens that the interests of earlier commentators are particularly aroused by the last three chapters of \textit{Physics} I (specifically dealing with the issue of motion, then of matter as the principle of physical change), by \textit{Metaphysics} I, 8 (where Aristotle addresses Empedocles and Anaxagoras on the subject of material principles), and by \textit{Metaphysics} II, 1-2 (on the finitude of causal chains)\textsuperscript{16}. Still, the (surviving) commentaries on these sections of Aristotle’s corpus dating to the first half of the 13th century are actually very few and their literary format is not uniform. What is more, virtually none of them is critically edited, some are not even accessible in printed edition\textsuperscript{17}.


\textsuperscript{16} From the outset of his career, Aquinas is particularly interested in these books of the Aristotelian corpus and knows them very well: suffice it to look at his \textit{De principiis naturae}, or at nearly 30 quotations from these books figuring in the first half of his Commentary on Book II of the \textit{Sentences}.

However, thanks to some remarkable developments in scholarship, a few important theses on matter circulating in the faculties of arts at both Paris and Oxford before and around the 1250s can be described.

1.2 With what follows, the example of Roger Bacon will serve to provide a sense of the debate taking place at the time. In his series of Parisian questions\textsuperscript{18} on Physics I and Metaphysics I-II\textsuperscript{19}, dating to


\textsuperscript{19} As for other readers of the \textit{Metaphysics}, also for Bacon to book II of \textit{Metaphysics} belong not only the three chapters of \(\alpha\), but also the chapters from 5 onwards of \(\alpha\), while the first book of \textit{Metaphysics} is ultimately reduced to \(\alpha\),

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the 1240s, matter is a recurrent topic, which Bacon approaches from several different perspectives. He dwells upon the ontological and epistemological status of (prime) matter, its origin (whether it was created by God at the very beginning of the world and how it was featured), its relationship to privation, form, being and non-being, potency, act, and corporeity. Moreover, Bacon asks what creatures are made out of matter, namely whether even spiritual beings are material, and he raises questions concerning prime matter, in order to establish whether all material beings — both celestial and sublunary bodies — are made out of the same kind of matter.

An in-depth doctrinal examination of these questions would be foreign to the purposes of the present discussion, so we will set for ourselves the more modest task of pinpointing some of Bacon’s major theses. We shall proceed with the help of an accurate and insightful paper by Silvia Donati20, which provides a clear outline of the 13th-century debate on matter. Donati focuses on the English commentary tradition of Aristotle’s Physics and singles out, among others, four of their key features. First, a strong tendency to go far beyond Aristotle; second, a weak dependency on Averroes’ interpretation of Aristotle — despite a strong dependency on his paraphrases of Aristotle’s littera —, due perhaps to a still superficial level of knowledge of the Commentator’s


thought (e.g., of his doctrine of the immateriality of celestial bodies)\(^\text{21}\); third, some acquaintance with certain of Avicenna’s doctrines (e.g. on corporeity, understood in a realist sense); finally, a marked taste for ontological pluralism. In this picture, Roger Bacon plays a major role. In fact, very well representative of his time’s doctrinal tendencies\(^\text{22}\), he raises several questions bound to become crucially important in late 13th-century philosophical debates, and elaborates very successful solutions to them. Three in particular are worth mentioning, none of which is Aristotelian, and all of which are to some extent inspired by Augustine and Avicebron. (i) Bacon supports universal hylomorphism. According to him not only sublunary and celestial beings, but also spiritual creatures are made out of matter\(^\text{23}\). Within this framework, the notion of matter has less of a physical than of a metaphysical connotation. Materiality amounts to a constitutive ontological feature distinctive of all creatures with respect to God the Creator. Despite existing in beings of different sorts, the essence of matter (i.e. being pure potentiality)


is the very same at any level of reality. (ii) Bacon draws a distinction between the concepts of physical and metaphysical matter. Indeed, he estimates that the proximate substrate of change is not prime matter, but some already-shaped-matter. To account for this, Bacon elaborates on the notion of an active potency of matter. At stake here is no longer the essence of matter, but one of its modes of existence. In his view, in fact, active potency is extrinsic to the essence of matter. And yet, it is a necessary feature of matter, making possible substantial change. In Bacon’s view, the quasi-formal principle that endows prime matter with a still imperfect form is privation. To be precise, physical matter amounts to a compound of prime matter and some generic form, which is apt to direct substantial change, once activated, towards other, numerically different, specific forms\textsuperscript{24}. (iii) With respect to substantial form, Bacon is therefore a pluralist\textsuperscript{25}.

To conclude this section, let us mention Albert the Great, whose commentary on Aristotle’s \textit{Physics} dates to approximately the beginning of the 1250s. Despite his extraneousness to the arts’ context\textsuperscript{26}, Albert’s reading is somehow receptive to the aforementioned theses\textsuperscript{27}. In fact, although Albert rejects the doctrine of universal hylomorphism, he does not completely dismiss the notion of universal matter. Moreover, in order to explain physical change, he admits of an active power of matter; interestingly, he tends to consider matter as really inseparable from corporeity\textsuperscript{28}. Therefore, as will soon be clearer, Albert’s position

\textsuperscript{24} Donati: “La discussione sulla materia ...”, pp. 218-230; Eadem: “Robert Kilwardby ...”, pp. 263-272. About the effective role of this theory in the different series of questions traditionally ascribed to Bacon, see also Eadem: “Pseudoepigrapha”, pp. 169-181.


\textsuperscript{27} See for example Albert \textsc{the Great}: \textit{Physica}, ed. Paul Hossfeld, Köln: Aschendorff 1987 (Opera omnia, t. 4.1), l. I, tr. 3, ch. 11-13, 17.

\textsuperscript{28} Rodolfi: \textit{Il concetto di materia ...}, pp. 64-71, 98-99, 121-125.

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must lie somewhere between that of the masters of the Faculty of Arts and that of Aquinas.

2. Early Aquinas on Matter

2.1 Matter from a physical perspective. Aquinas deals with matter in the first two chapters of his *De principiis naturae*, where generation is at issue. In this context his perspective is mainly physical. In addition to some literal borrowings and doctrinal imprints from Averroes, in his background there are Avicenna and, of course, Aristotle.

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Aquinas starts by drawing a distinction between two meanings of matter. Broadly speaking, matter is whatever is in potency with respect to either accidental or substantial being. Properly speaking, it is what is in potency with respect to substantial being only. Indeed, in itself matter has incomplete being and it is given actual being by an extrinsic, supervenient principle: form. In other words, matter is a potential, completely unformed being. By drawing this distinction, Aquinas intends to set the proper notion of matter apart from that of subject. While matter is characterized by ontological incompleteness and existential dependence upon form, any subject possesses in itself complete being, so that it depends on nothing else as far as its subsistence is concerned. Therefore, subjects have some matter, but they are not bare matter.

Following Aristotle, Aquinas includes matter in its proper sense among the necessary conditions for generation and he tries to account for how it relates respectively to form and privation, since in his view these three principles are distinct from one another at least “secundum rationem”.

Concerning matter and privation, Aquinas remarks that, despite being the same in subject, they differ in definition. In fact, while matter exists in potency, privation is actually non-being, mere absence of form. Indeed, matter is inseparable from privation, in the very same way as man is from his capacity for laughing. Matter can never be without privation and, as a consequence, it permanently is —irrespective of whatever form actualizes it— in a privative condition with respect to any form non-instantiated in it. Still, matter is not privation tout court. In fact, taken by itself, it is not sufficient for generation and it is exactly


36 Ibid., p. 40.69.
37 Ibid., p. 41.54.
38 Ibid., p. 40.70.
39 Ibid., pp. 40.18-23, 41.109-119.
by virtue of privation that its potentiality can be oriented towards one form rather than another. What is more, by contrast with privation (but as with form), matter not only contributes to the coming-to-be of a certain being, but it is also a constitutive part of it.

With respect to the relationship matter bears to form, Aquinas claims that, in order for matter to exist, there must be some form inhering in it. This is the reason why prime matter (hyle) cannot subsist as such, but only as a concept obtained by abstraction from any form and privation. Being bare matter irreducible to any hylomorphic compound, it can be neither defined nor properly known. Moreover, prime matter must be numerically one in all hylomorphic compounds —of which it is a metaphysical component—, since the lack of intrinsic determining features prevent it from multiplication.

2.2 Matter from a theological perspective. Special interest in the topic of matter emerges from the first half of Aquinas’ commentary on Book II of the Sentences, where the creation of immaterial and material being is at issue. There are at least three of the Lombard’s passages which give him cause to delve into the question: chapter 1 of d. 3, on the immateriality of angels; chapter 5 of d. 12, on the creation of (first) matter; and chapter 5 of d. 18, concerning seminal reasons. In what follows, we will turn our attention to Aquinas’ commentary on these distinctions, specifically to those articles in which the notion of matter enters into the picture.

2.2.1 In the first article of his commentary on Book II of the Sentences, d. 3, Aquinas focuses on the ontological structure of angels and determines that, though not simple, angels do not admit of hylomorphic composition. Aquinas’ aim is primarily exegetical. Actually, it is Peter Lombard’s claim that the angelic essence is simple, indivisible, and

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40 Ibid.
41 Ibid., p. 41.74-81.
42 Ibid., p. 41.98-108.
43 For an historical introduction to this work, see Adriano Oliva: Les débuts de l’enseignement de Thomas d’Aquin et sa conception de la sacra doctrina, avec l’édition du prologue de son commentaire des Sentences, Paris: Vrin 2006.
immaterial\textsuperscript{44}, that gives rise to this question concerning the kind of composition, if any, that characterizes separate substances. Nonetheless, Aquinas’ concern is also philosophical and, more precisely, metaphysical. Let us see why this is the case.

Aquinas’ solution can be divided into three parts. (i) He starts by raising the question of the (im)materiality of angels in very general terms. In fact, he wonders whether all creatures (including angels) are essentially material. Having answered in the negative, (ii) he moves on to demonstrate that angels are immaterial creatures. His proof is twofold. (ii-a) He first infers the immateriality of angels from their intellective nature, then (ii-b) from their incorporeity. Finally, (iii) he concludes by explaining what kind of compounds angels are. In what follows I will focus on the first two steps of Aquinas’ reasoning, refraining from an extensive treatment of the third part of Aquinas’ text, as it bears on the notion of matter only indirectly. By describing act-potency composition in angels, despite the absence of a hylomorphic one, Aquinas shows his refusal to identify matter with potency\textsuperscript{45}.

(i) In order to establish the possibility of immaterial creatures, Aquinas reviews three opinions about the relationship the notion of createdness bears to that of materiality. To begin, he mentions universal hylomorphism, which he describes as a thesis quite popular among his contemporaries\textsuperscript{46} ultimately ascribing it to Avicebron\textsuperscript{47}. Although Aquinas does not make this point explicitly, this thesis implies that, insofar as they are created, angels are not only material beings, but also composed of the very same matter as any other either celestial or

\textsuperscript{44} Peter Lombard: Sententiae ..., II, dist. 3, p. 341.19-21 (emphasis mine): “Et quatuor quidem angelis videntur esse attributa in initio substantiae suae, scilicet essentia simplex, id est indivisibilis et immaterialis; et discretio personalis”.

\textsuperscript{45} See Porro: Tommaso ..., pp. 24, 40.

\textsuperscript{46} See Donati: La materia ..., pp. 209-218.

\textsuperscript{47} Thomas Aquinas: Super libros Sententiarum [henceforth: SSLS], II, ed. Pierre Mandonnet, Paris: Lethielleux 1929, d. 3, q. 1, a. 1, sol (p. 86): “Dicendum, quod circa hanc materiam tres sunt positiones. Quidam enim dicunt quod in omni substantia creata est materia, et quod omnium est materia una ; et hujus positionis auctor videtur Avicebron, qui fecit librum Fontis vitae, quem multi sequuntur”.

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sublunary creature\textsuperscript{48}. According to Aquinas, in fact, Avicebron’s thesis is based on a twofold presupposition: on the one hand, that matter is the distinctive feature of created beings \textit{qua} created; on the other, that the matter out of which creatures are made is the same at any ontological level, in such a way that the notion of matter is not reducible to that of corporeity.

The second thesis Aquinas refers to is Avicenna’s\textsuperscript{49}, according to whom creatures can be either material or immaterial, and matter is only

\textsuperscript{48} On Ibn Gabirol’s doctrine of matter, see Mariaenza \textsc{Benedetto}: “La dimensione fondante della realtà: la materia di Ibn Gabirol e Shem Tov ben Yosef ibn Falaquera”, \textit{Quaestio}, VII (2007), pp. 229-244. On the reception of this doctrine in the Latin, see \textsc{Eadem} (transl.): \textit{Avicebron. La fonte della vita}, Milano: Bompiani 2007, pp. 141-197; Fernand \textsc{Brunner}: \textit{Platonisme et aristotélisme. La critique d’Ibn Gabirol par saint Thomas d’Aquin}, Louvain: Publications Universitaires de Louvain 1965.

\textsuperscript{49} Thomas \textsc{Aquinas}: \textit{SSLS} II, d. 3, q. 1, a. 1, sol (p. 86): “Secunda positio est quod materia non est in substantiis incorporeis, sed tamen est in omnibus corporibus, etiam una; et haec est positio Avicennae”. Cf. for example \textsc{Avicenna Latinus}: \textit{Liber de Philosophia prima sive scientia divina}, ed. Simone Van Riet, Louvain-Leiden: Peeters-Brill 1977-1980, vol. I, tr. II, 1, p. 68.76-77; \textit{ibid.}, tr. II, 2, p. 76.32-82.44. See however \textsc{Avicenna Latinus}: \textit{Liber primus naturalium: tractatus primus de causis et principiis naturalium}, ed. Simone Van Riet, Louvain-Leiden: Peeters-Brill, 1992, tr. I, 35.1-36.31. It is likely that Aquinas draws inspiration for his outline from Averroes, cf. \textsc{Averroes}: \textit{In Metaph.}, Venice: Apud Iunctas 1562 [Frankfurt am Main: Minerva 1962] (Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois commentariis, t. 8), XI(I) c. 10 (296v aM- 297r aA; [emphasis mine]): “Et si omnia, que transmutantur, habent materiam […] , sed naturae materiarum diversantur secundum modos naturae transmutationis, materia autem generabilium est in potentia, translatorum autem est in actu, cum translatum sit aliquod in actu, et ideo quod ex translatis fuerit non generabile neque corruptibile, non habebit materiam, quam habet generabile et corruptibile, et est quae est in potentia; et quasi dicat, et omnia aeterna quae sunt non generabilia, sed moventur motu secundum translationem, habent materiam, sed non habent materiam generabilium, materiam eorum, quae moventur de ubi in ubi. Et ex hoc videtur corpus coeleste non habere potentiam divisibilem secundum divisionem corporis, scilicet formam materialem […] . Avicenna autem erravit in hoc, cum dicit quod materia, quae est in potentia, existit in omnibus corporibus”. It is noteworthy that in later texts, while ultimately maintaining his critical position towards Avicebron’s doctrine of universal matter, on the one hand Aquinas will stop to mention Avicenna in contexts dealing with the unicity of prime matter and, on the other, will criticize more and more harshly Averroes’ option. Cf. for example Thomas \textsc{Aquinas}:
in sublunary and celestial corporeal substances; indeed, it is the very same in all of them. The implication of these premises—which, once again, Aquinas does not make explicit—is that in Avicenna’s cosmos only spiritual creatures are immaterial. Accordingly, material and corporeal are coextensive notions and both can be predicated univocally of celestial as well as sublunary substances. As it emerges from his subsequent remarks, Aquinas appears to think that Avicenna’s doctrine is, unlike Avicebron’s, theologically sound, yet philosophically weak. As a consequence, Aquinas could well be content with the Avicennian conclusion as far as angels’ ontological structure is concerned; his dissatisfaction is about the physical and cosmological implications of such a thesis.

The third opinion Aquinas examines is traced back to Maimonides and Averroes, who partially agree with Avicenna. With him they maintain that only corporeal beings are material and they exclude any kind of hylomorphic composition in angels. In other words, Aquinas thinks that, as does Avicenna, Maimonides and Averroes conceive of materiality and corporeity as necessarily linked to one another—certainly as coextensive, possibly even as intentionally equivalent. On the other hand, Aquinas recognizes that they disagree with Avicenna on the nature of bodies, since they consider celestial and elementary matters irreducible to one another. In other words, superlunary and sublunary

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50 Thomas Aquinas: SSLS II, d. 3, q. 1, a. 1, sol (p. 86): “Tertia positio est quod corpora caelestia et elementa non communicant in materia: et haec est positio Averrois [...] et Rabby Moysis”.


52 Cf. Averroes: In Metaph. VIII, c. 11; Ibid. X, c. 12; Ibid., c. 26; Ibid. XI(I), c. 10; IDEM: Sermo de substantia orbis, Venice: Apud Iunctas 1562 [Frankfurt am Main: Minerva 1962] (Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois commentariis, t. 9), ch. 2, passim; Ibid., ch. 5. Note that at this stage Aquinas passes over some implications of Averroes’ thesis, namely the lack of hylomorphic composition in celestial bodies. See below, p. 59.

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beings do not possess bodies of the same type, but rather are equivocally bodies. Aquinas characterizes Maimonides’ and Averroes’ thesis as the one most genuinely Aristotelian\(^{53}\), and for that reason adopts it.

(ii) Aquinas moves on to proving the immateriality of separate substances. (ii-a) The first argument he provides is not new: he infers the immateriality of angels from their intellectual nature\(^{54}\). Appearing repeatedly in Aquinas’ works\(^{55}\), it derives from the thought of Averroes\(^{56}\). Note that at this stage, Aquinas considers the notion of matter independently from that of body, as if he were still disposed

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\(^{53}\) Thomas Aquinas: SSLS II, d. 3, q. 1, a. 1, sol (p. 86): “Et videtur magis dictis Aristotelis consonare; et ideo istam [positionem] eligimus quantum ad praezens pertinet, dicentes, quod quidquid sit de corporalibus, in angelis nullo modo potest esse materia”.

\(^{54}\) Ibid.: “Quod enim nullum intellectuale sit materiale, communiter a philosophis retinetur. Unde etiam ex immaterialitate divina ejus intellectum conclundunt. Et ratio satis manifesta est, quia materia prima recipit formam, non inquantum est forma simpliciter, sed inquantum est intellecta nisi in potentia, quia cognitio est formae, inquantum est forma; et ideo, si intellectus aliquid poneretur habens materiam, forma existens in eo non esset haec: unde forma existens in materia non est intellecta in actu: et sic per formam illam non intelligeret. Hujus etiam signum est, quod forma materialis non efficitur intellectualis, nisi quia a conditionibus materiae abstrahitur; et sic efficitur perfectio intellectus proportionata sibi: unde oportet intellectum non materialem esse: et hoc non sequitur materiam ex parte alicujus formae, cum omnis forma per abstractionem a conditionibus materiae intelligibilis fiat; sed consequitur eam secundum se, et virtualiter, sive sit sub forma corporali sive spirituali”.

\(^{55}\) See for instance Thomas Aquinas: De Ente et essentia, p. 375.1-376.33; SSLS I, d. 8, q. 5, a. 2, sol; ibid., d. 35, q. 1, a. 1, sol. The argument is provided as evidence for respectively the immateriality of angels, soul and God. See also SSLS II, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1, sol (p. 13): “Tertia via est ex immaterialitate ipsius Dei: oportet enim causam moventem caelum esse virtutem non in materia, ut in VIII Physicor. [...] probatur [...].”

to meet the supporters of universal hylomorphism halfway, and to evaluate the possibility of incorporeal material substances. However, proceeding from shared premises, Aquinas comes to refute their thesis by pointing out that no enmattered form, irrespective of its being corporeal or not, can perform any intellectual activity. (ii-b) The second argument, once again directed to the supporters of universal hylomorphism, disproves their thesis decisively. Here Aquinas rejects the only presupposition he had previously conceded them. Rather than on the notions of matter and intelligibility, Aquinas focuses here on that of corporeity. As do Avicenna, Averroes and Maimonides, he intends to show that it cannot be disjointed from the notion of matter. In fact, he deduces the immateriality of angels from their incorporeity—which he takes for granted—, showing that there is no material being which can be incorporeal\(^{57}\). Let us reconstruct briefly the structure of Aquinas’ reasoning, in which Avicennian and Averroian elements intermingle\(^{58}\).

He moves from the assumption that there is a one-to-one correspondence between what is perfectible and its relative perfection. This is exactly the case of matter with respect to form. Being in itself indistinct, either conceptually or really, prime matter can be differentiated only by virtue of form. More precisely, being just one, prime matter cannot be differentiated otherwise than by one single form. Which one? Aquinas argues that this is the function of the form of corporeity. In fact—as he makes clear step by step—, for any diversity to obtain in matter, there must be a plurality of diverse parts. However, there can be

\(^{57}\) Thomas Aquinas: SSLS II, d. 3, q. 1, a. 1, sol (p. 86-87, emphasis mine): “Secundo incorporeitas repugnat materiae: cum enim uni perfectibili debeatur una perfectio, et in materia prima non sit ulla diversitas, oportet quod omnis forma ante quam non potest in ea esse ulla diversitas, nec intelligi, investiat eam totam. Sed ante corporeitatem non potest intelligi aliqua diversitas quia diversitas praesupponit partes, quae non possunt esse nisi praenticelligatur divisibilitas quae consequitur quantitatem, quae sine corporeitate non est. Unde oportet quod tota materia sit vestita forma corporeitatis; et ideo si aliquid est incorporeum, oportet esse immateriale”. Concerning Aquinas on corporeality, see Carlos B. Bazán: “La corporalité selon saint Thomas d’Aquin”, Revue philosophique de Louvain, LXXXI-51 (1983), pp. 369-409; Wippel: The Metaphysical Thought ..., pp. 327-351.

no parts in a whole apart from division and, ultimately, quantity. Hence, since the form of corporeity is a necessary condition for any quantitative and dimensional determinations, there can be quantity only in corporeal matter. Accordingly, there cannot be matter without corporeity, with the consequence that all and only sublunary and celestial bodies are material. Yet this is not the case with angels: being incorporeal, they are necessarily immaterial.

To conclude this section, let us try to situate the doctrine of matter emerging from a. 1 of Aquinas’ commentary on Book II, d.3, of the Sentences with respect to that of De principiis. In a word, Aquinas definitely enlarges his scope at least from two points of view. First, on the basis of his Arabic sources he connects the notion of matter to that of corporeity, making them mutually dependent. Moreover, he excludes the possibility of matter being the distinctive feature of creatures, differentiating them from their Creator. Therefore, in this specific context Aquinas diverges substantially from the mainstream of the Arts Faculty.

59 In the SSLS this argument has already been exploited by Aquinas, in his proof of the immateriality of soul: cf. Thomas Aquinas: SSLS I, d. 8, q. 5, a. 2 (pp. 228-229, emphasis mine): “Et propterea materia prima, prout consideratur nuda ab omni forma, non habet aliquam diversitatem, sed efficitur diversa per aliqua accidentia ante adventum formae substantialis cum esse accidentale non praecedat substantiale. Uni autem perfectibili debetur una perfectio. Ergo oportet quod prima forma substantialis perficiat totam materiam. Sed prima forma quae recipitur in materia est corporeitas, a qua nunquam denudatur, ut dicit Commentator in I Physic. [text. com. 63]. Ergo forma corporeitas est in tota materia, et ita materia non erit nisi in corporibus. Si enim dices, quod quidditas substantiae esset prima forma recepta in materia, adhuc redibit in idem; quia ex quidditate substantiae materia non habet divisionem, sed ex corporeitate, quam consequuntur dimensiones quantitatis in actu; et postea per divisionem materiae, secundum quod disponitur diversis sitibus, acquiruntur in ipsa diversae formae [...]”. On this argument, see Wippel: The Metaphysical Thought ..., pp. 347-368. For further evolution of this same argument, see Thomas Aquinas: Summa Thologiae, I, q. 50, a. 2, sol. On these passages by Aquinas, see Bazán: “La corporalité ...”, passim; Wippel: The Metaphysical Thought ..., pp. 347-357. It is quite helpful to read these texts in the light of the notion of body emerging from Thomas Aquinas: De ente et essentia, pp. 371.105-372.150).

60 At that time this thesis was also quite common among theologians in their discussions of angels.
2.2.2 Aquinas returns to the topic of matter in his commentary on d. 12 of Book II of Peter Lombard’s Sentences. As he remarks in his divisio textus, from this distinction onwards Peter is concerned with the creation of corporeal nature. At stake is specifically the exegesis of the opening verses of Genesis, and particularly of the term “terra”, qualified as “inanis et vacua”. To what does it refer exactly? On the one hand, Peter seems to take it as standing for the four elements, ether excluded. On the other, by the phrase “omnia corporalia” he seems to designate all things deriving from unformed matter, so as to leave open the question of celestial bodies.

It is precisely on this undecided issue that Aquinas focuses at the beginning of his commentary on d. 12, by asking whether there is only one matter out of which all bodies are made — in exegetical terms: whether in the beginning also celestial bodies are derived from the same “formless and empty earth” as sublunary bodies. Unlike Peter’s, Aquinas’ approach to the topic is veritably philosophical, as is clear

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61 Peter Lombard: Sententiae ..., II, d. 12, pp. 384.10-12; 385.16-17.

62 See Thomas Aquinas: SSLS II, d. 12, q. 1, a. 1, arg. 2. Cf. also Peter Lombard: Sententiae ..., I, d. 2, which Aquinas seems to have in mind when commenting d. 12.

63 The relevance of Aquinas’ question becomes clearer if we take into account the whole of his commentary on d. 12, especially Thomas Aquinas: SSLS II, d. 12, q. 1, a. 5 (p. 316-317): “Per opus creationis instituta est tota creatura quantum ad esse suum informe; unde quae non possunt duci ad unum informe principium, quod est materia, facient numerum in operibus creatiosiens [...]”. Similiter etiam corporum caelestium et inferiorum non est una materia; et ideo numeratur caelum, et materia quatuor elementorum”. Cf. also Bonaventure: Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarum, eds. Quaracchi, Ad Claras Aquas: Ex typographia collegii S. Bonaventurae 1885, II, d. 12, primum dubium (pp. 306b-307a): “Dicendum, quod etsi multae sint expositiones huius verbi: In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram; quatuor tamen sunt principales, et secundum has differenter exponitur nomen terrae [...]. Quarta expositio, quae communior est secundum expositores et planior, est, quod per caelum intelligatur caelum empyreum, quod est Angelorum habitaculum, in quo Angeli sunt creati; per terram vero materia omnium corporum intra ipsum contentorum, sive caelestium sive terrestrialium. Haec exposito sequenti litterae concordat, quae exprimit, de illa materia facta esse corpora caelestia et elementaria”.

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from the very terms in which he formulates his question\textsuperscript{64}. In keeping with the aforementioned text from d. 3, Aquinas rejects the possibility of reducing to one single kind of prime matter both sublunary and celestial beings. Once again, he takes as his starting point the juxtaposition of the Avicennian\textsuperscript{65} and the Averroistic solutions\textsuperscript{66}; then he opts for the view of Averroes; once again, for exegetical reasons: because of his closer adherence to Aristotle\textsuperscript{67}. Let us consider his argument.

The first thesis Aquinas expounds is Avicenna’s: all bodies share one only kind of matter. In Aquinas’ view, Avicenna grounds his opinion on the notion of corporeity, considering it univocally applicable to all material beings insofar as they are material (and then, by virtue of that, they are bodies). This reconstruction by Aquinas calls for a couple of remarks. First, it is worth noting that, although what is at stake here is a notion already used in d. 3, i.e., that of corporeity, Aquinas assigns it a different role in this context. While in d. 3 he does not explicitly trace such a notion to Avicenna and refers to it in his own solution to the question raised, something different occurs here, where Aquinas sets this notion —now explicitly attributed to Avicenna— aside, as unsuited to his own point. Actually, this is not incoherent, since Aquinas’ perspective changes: whereas in d. 3 he invokes corporeity against the


\textsuperscript{65} Thomas Aquinas: SSLS II, d. 12, q. 1, a. 1, sol (p. 302): “Dicendum, quod super hoc invenitur duplex philosophorum opinio, quarum utraque sectatores habet. Avicenna enim [...] videtur ponere unam materiam esse omnium corporum, argumentum ex ratione corporeitatis assumens, quae cum sit unius rationis, una sibi materia debetur”. Note that, as before, Aquinas likely describes the alternative between the two options from an Averroian perspective. Indeed, unlike before, he introduces Averroes’ viewpoint as specifically formulated against Avicenna.

\textsuperscript{66} \textit{Ibid.}: “Hanc autem positionem Commentator improbare intendit in princ. Caeli et mundi et in pluribus aliis locis”.

\textsuperscript{67} \textit{Ibid.} (p. 303): “Et hoc videtur probabilius, et magis consonum dictis Philosophi”. The argumentative structure of the parallel passage in \textit{Summa Theologiae} (I, q. 66, a. 2, sol) will be quite different. In particular, the position here attributed to Avicenna will be there traced back to Avicebron. Moreover, also Averroes’ option will be rejected there.
supporters of spiritual matter, in d. 12 he considers it in connection with the very notion of (corporeal) matter.

Secondly, it is interesting to draw attention to a few slight, but significant, terminological shifts between d. 3 and d. 12. While in the former Aquinas speaks of a “form of corporeity” and seems to give it something of an ontological relevance, in d. 12 this is no longer the case, at least not in the solution, where he refers rather to the ratio corporeitatis and seems to ascribe to Avicenna a weak account, so to say, of corporeity. In fact, Aquinas does not ultimately provide an unambiguous reading of Avicenna, with the result that it is unclear whether he considers Avicenna’s doctrine as implying a merely logical or even an ontological priority of corporeity with respect to further formal determinations. An ontological priority seems to be involved in the first argument of the article, but it is not traced to Avicenna.

The second thesis Aquinas considers is Averroes’, introducing it as a recurrent argument of the Commentator, and indeed as formulated expressly against Avicenna. Aquinas’ reasoning runs as follows. (i) First premise: since (sublunary) matter is in potency with respect to all (natural) forms and cannot be actualized by more than one simultaneously, matter is always in potency with respect to any form.

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69 To be precise Aquinas speaks here of (prime) matter in general, without qualification. What he intends to prove, starting from the assumption that there is just one prime matter, is that such a matter cannot be common to all hylomorphic compounds, i.e. sublunary as well as celestial. Note that in considering celestial bodies as hylomorphic compounds, Aquinas actually ends up not following Averroes. Of course, the characterization of matter here is physical. Thomas Aquinas: SSLS II, d. 12, q. 1, a. 1, arg. 1 (p. 301): “Quorumcumque enim est forma unius rationis, eorum est una materia communis, eo quod proprius actus in propria potentia fit, ut dicit Philosophus […]. Sed forma corporeitatis est unius rationis in omnibus corporibus. Ergo videtur quod una materia sit superiorum et inferiorum corporum”.

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not yet (or no longer) instantiated in it\textsuperscript{71}. (ii) Second premise\textsuperscript{72}: there is a one-to-one correspondence between natural active and passive potencies. If this were not the case, some of them would necessarily remain unfulfilled. Therefore, the nonexistence of certain active potencies implies the same of their respective passive potencies. Turning his attention to celestial matter’s passive potency, Aquinas considers whether there exists an active potency capable of actuating in a given celestial body’s material substrate any new form (be it celestial or not). By contrast with sublunary bodies, with celestial ones, such is not the case. As a result, their constitutive matter cannot have the same passive potency as sublunary matter. In fact, since celestial bodies are incorruptible, their forms admit of no contrary and cannot be separated from their respective material substrates. Put another way, no chunk of celestial matter can be in potency with respect to any form (celestial nor sublunary), other than the one by which it is concretely actualized, and by means of which the celestial body turns out to be the specific kind of subsisting body it actually is. (iii) Conclusion: celestial matter cannot be reduced —as far as its essence is concerned—to sublunary matter, since the latter is in potency with respect to many forms (which it can take up and lose by undergoing natural processes of generation and corruption), while the former is not.

Unsatisfied with this direct proof of the irreducibility of celestial and sublunary matter, Aquinas provides two other arguments in its favor, both of which are structured as proofs by contradiction. (α) First\textsuperscript{73}, Aquinas implicitly responds to the following objection: while we acknowledge that, being in potency with respect to many forms, prime


\textsuperscript{72} This argument is often exploited by Averroes: cf. for example Averroes: \textit{Commentum magnum super libro de caelo et mundo}, eds. Francis J. Carmody (†), Rüdiger Arnzen, Leuven: Peeters 2003, I, c. 20 (vol. 1, pp. 38.71-39.84).

\textsuperscript{73} On this argument, see Baldner: “Thomas Aquinas ...”, p. 446-447. Baldner takes this argument as an objection in favour of celestial bodies’ hylomorphic composition, a thesis Aquinas has just rejected in his solution.
matter’s potentiality cannot be exhausted by any sublunary substantial form inhering in it, this is not necessarily the case with celestial forms, because of their perfection\textsuperscript{74}. According to him, his previous argument can be proved true, even if the nobility of celestial forms is taken into account. Since, if actualized by just one (even celestial) form, the potentiality of the underlying matter would remain unfulfilled, that is, incompletely actualized, in so far as privation would remain a necessary concomitant of it. In fact, in order to bring prime sublunary matter to a complete actualization, any form—including the most perfect ones—would need instantiating in it together with all the other forms with respect to which such a prime matter is in potency\textsuperscript{75}. Still, this is impossible because of the natures both of celestial forms—which are incorruptible and thus irreplaceable by other forms—and of sublunary prime matter,—which cannot be actualized simultaneously by multiple forms. Consequently, we must exclude the possibility that celestial and sublunary matter can be reduced to one and the same prime matter\textsuperscript{76}.

\textsuperscript{74} This objection is intended to account for the impossibility of one celestial body’s changing into another, without looking at their material substrate. Interestingly enough, this objection seems to arise from a thesis Aquinas himself shares: the form of celestial bodies is such that it exhausts in itself all the potentiality of matter apt to receive that specific form—which implies that celestial bodies belong to one-membered species. Cf. Thomas Aquinas: SSLS I, d. 19, q. 4, a. 2, sol. Note that, unlike Albert the Great, Aquinas does not explicitly opt for or against the unicity of celestial matter. See Rodolfi: “La dottrina della materia celeste ...”, pp. 32, 35.

\textsuperscript{75} Cf. Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologiae, I, q. 66, a. 2, sol (ed. Leon., t. 5, p. 157a): “Nec hoc excluditur, si una illarum formarum sit perfectior et continens in se virtute alias [...]. Sic ergo materia, secundum quod est sub forma incorruptibilis corporis, erit adhuc in potentia ad formam corruptibilis corporis. Et cum non habeat eam in actu, erit simul sub forma et privatione: quia carentia formae in eo quod est in potentia ad formam, est privatio. Haec autem dispositio est corruptibilis corporis. Impossibile ergo est quod corporis corruptibilis et incorruptibilis per naturam, sit una materia”.

\textsuperscript{76} In his answer to the fifth objection, Aquinas seems willing to go even further. In fact, he tentatively compares—by reference to Averroes—celestial matter to sublunary substrates, instead of to sublunary matter. As it is well known, Aquinas no longer entertains such a comparison in his later works. See Litt: Les corps célestes ..., p. 90. It seems to me that the main interest of this development is exegetical rather than philosophical. To put it differently, Aquinas’ doubts do not concern his fundamental philosophical options—particularly his commitment...
(β) Second, Aquinas focuses on another problematic implication of the objection just rejected. If celestial and sublunary bodies can be reduced to one and the same prime matter, then any corruptible compound is potentially incorruptible, since its substrate would be in potency with respect to any celestial form not inhering in it; and vice versa, celestial bodies would be potentially corruptible, their material substrate being in potency with respect to any sublunary form too, which contradicts the idea that there is no contrariety among celestial forms. Therefore, the possibility of reducing celestial and sublunary matter to one and the same prime matter must be excluded.

Aquinas concludes by discussing another objection to his thesis: celestial and sublunary matter are the same as far as their bare foundation is concerned, that is, once all their determinations are stripped away, but differ from each other if the types of movement they can undergo are taken into consideration. Aquinas unconditionally rejects such an option. It is worth noting here that his target could very well be Albert the Great. In Aquinas’ view, in fact, since any actuality is determined by its respective potency (rather than the other way round), diversity of movement does not cause, but rather is caused by diversity of matter.

To sum up, in answering the question about the nature of celestial prime matter, Aquinas follows the Commentator, whose option seems to the hylomorphic composition of all bodies, including celestial ones—, but rather the way in which Averroes’ doctrine of celestial matter—as emerging from his *De substantia orbis*—should actually be read. From a doctrinal point of view, it is likely consistent to think that, even according to the early Aquinas, celestial prime matter is in potency properly speaking neither with respect to substantial, nor to local change, but only with respect to celestial substantial form. For a different interpretation see Baldner: “Thomas Aquinas...”, p. 446, 449-451. Concerning Averroes on the immateriality of celestial bodies, see Matteo Di Giovanni: “Averroes on the Species of Celestial Bodies”, in *Wissen über Grenzen. Arabisches Wissen und lateinisches Mittelalter*, eds. Andreas Speer, Lydia Wegener, Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter 2006 (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 33), pp. 438-464: 440-443; Silvia Donati: “La dottrina di Egidio Romano sulla materia dei corpi celesti. Discussioni sulla natura dei corpi celesti alla fine del tredicesimo secolo”, *Medioevo*, XII (1986), pp. 229-280: 230-235.

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77 On this argument, see Baldner: “Thomas Aquinas...”, p. 447.
79 Albert the Great: *In II Sent.*, d. 3, a. 4. On this passage see Rodolfi: *Il concetto ...,* p. 68.
more reliable than Avicenna’s, ultimately for exegetical reasons (as we have seen in d. 3). Averroes’ reading of Aristotle and, in particular, the way in which he solves the apparent contradictions\textsuperscript{80} of the Philosopher’s doctrine of matter is the most satisfying. Once again, in this text of his commentary on Sentences, Aquinas substantiates the doctrine of De principiis and extends its scope so as to include an accounting for heavenly matter. Therefore, it is on the metaphysical notion of matter that he focuses here, where his interest lies in the ontological structure of bodies, rather than in their physical capacity for movement.

2.2.3 Further along in his commentary on d. 12, Aquinas discusses different readings of Genesis’ opening. While showing a keen preference for Augustine’s interpretation —wherein the Hexaëmeron describes successively what actually happened instantly—, Aquinas examines and substantiates Gregory the Great’s reading\textsuperscript{81} - wherein God’s work of creation was actually six days long, as different beings were created in different moments, starting from formless matter in which everything was indistinctly contained. While in a. 3 Aquinas delves into the Augustinian interpretation, in a. 4-5 he takes up Gregory’s, specifically considering its philosophical implications. In what follows, our focus will be on a. 4.

\textsuperscript{80} Cf. SSLS II, d. 12, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4 (p. 304): “Philosophus in libris Phys. nondum probaverat esse quintam essentiam, quod in principio Caeli et mundi demonstrat; et ideo in libris Phys. nihil determinat de his quae sunt propria illi essentiae, propter quod etiam tractatum De infinito, ut Commentator dicit in I Caeli et mundi, reiterat”.

\textsuperscript{81} On the reasons of such a choice, which is made several times in the following distinctions, see ibid. a. 2, sol (p. 305-306): “[...] quae ad fidem pertinent, dupliciter distinguuntur. Quaedam enim sunt per se substantia fidei, ut Deum esse trinum et unum [...], in quibus nulli licet aliter opinari [...]. Quaedam vero per accidens tantum, inquantum scilicet in Scriptura traduntur, quam fides supponit Spiritu sancto dictante promulgatam esse: quae quidem ignorari sine periculo possunt ab his qui Scripturas scire non tenentur, sicut multa historialia: et in his etiam sancti diversa senserunt Scripturam divinam diversmode exponentes. Sic ergo circa mundi principium aliquid est quod ad substantiam fidei pertinet, scilicet mundum incepisse creatum, et hoc omnes sancti concorditer dicunt. Quo autem modo et ordine factus sit, non pertinet ad fidem nisi per accidens, inquantum in Scriptura traditur, cujus veritatem diversa expositione sancti salvantes, diversa tradiderunt”.

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Here the question Aquinas raises concerns the ontological status of primordial formless and empty matter\(^{82}\): can it possibly have been formally indeterminate and, at the same time, self-subsisting? In fact, if God created matter before any other being, in the beginning, He must have made it to exist \textit{qua} matter (a first requirement) and, moreover, to be further determinable (a second requirement). Aquinas tries then to characterize primordial matter, i.e., to single out what could constitute a formless and empty earth.

He suggests two possibilities. (1) The first is bare prime matter, the most basic substrate of any natural body, to which any corporeal being can ultimately be reduced. Aquinas rules this out by examining the distinctive features of prime matter\(^{83}\). Explicitly grounded on Aristotle\(^{84}\) and Avicenna\(^{85}\), his description is completely consistent with the one sketched in \textit{De principiis}, shared also by his contemporaries. About prime matter he makes the following observations. First, it has absolutely no form, otherwise it would not be prime: it would be a hylomorphic compound. Second, it can be known only analogically, that is, insofar as it relates to some knowable substantial form. Third, it cannot exist by itself, but only as the matter of some hylomorphic compound, thanks to some form inhering in it. While the first two features meet the determinability requirement, the third fails to meet the subsistence requirement. This is why, from Gregory’s perspective, the formless earth of Genesis cannot be the prime matter of the philosophers. And yet, according to Augustine’s reading, it can be prime matter. On his view, the distinction between primordial matter and the material substrate of hylomorphic (primordial) compounds is purely logical, so that the self-subsistence of the former is not required.

(2) The second possibility for primordial matter is only-relatively-formless matter. On this account, in the beginning God would have created prime matter under some very general form\(^{86}\). Taking for

\(^{82}\) Aquinas’ article also has an exegetical aim with respect to Peter Lombard: \textit{Sentetiae...}, II, d. 12, p. 387.15-26.

\(^{83}\) Thomas Aquinas: \textit{SSLS} II, d. 12, q. 1, a. 4, sol.

\(^{84}\) Aristotle: \textit{Physics}, A7, 191a 7-12.


\(^{86}\) Thomas Aquinas: \textit{SSLS} II, d. 12, q. 1, a. 4, sol (p. 313-314): “Alio modo dicitur materia prima secundum quod «primum» importat ordinem temporis:

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granted the adequacy of this second possibility, Aquinas focuses on primordial matter’s formal aspect, and this to determine how many forms were involved in it and what they were. To this end, he reviews several options. After having excluded two theses ascribed to ancient philosophers (by simply hinting at Aristotle’s refutation of them)\(^87\), Aquinas focuses on two modern versions of pluralism\(^88\) and rejects both on the authority of Averroes and Avicenna. Finally, he proposes a third solution, ascribable to theologians, and embraces it\(^89\).

(i) According to the partisans of the first modern option, prime matter was originally created under one single pre-elemental form, related to the elemental forms as something imperfect to its corresponding perfection, like the form of an embryo to that of a fully formed animal, as Aquinas puts it\(^90\). Even if he does not trace this first option to anybody in particular, in view of the example he suggests, he likely intends to reconstruct a pluralist doctrine quite popular in the first half of the 13\(^{th}\) century, also embraced by Bonaventure in his commentary on Sentences\(^91\).

(ii) The second option Aquinas ascribes to Avicebron: matter

\[\text{illud scilicet quod duratione praecessit ordinatam dispositionem partium mundi, qualis nunc cernitur, secundum eos qui ponunt mundum non semper fuisse, nec a principio creationis omnia distincta fore: et sic accipiendo primam materiam, oportuit eam habere aliquam formam\}].\]

\(^87\) \textit{Ibid.}: “…Sed circa hoc antiqui philosophi diversificati sunt. Quidam enim posuerunt eam esse totam sub una forma […]. Alii vero posuerunt eam sub pluribus formis […]. Et hoc tamen diversimode posuerunt […]. Et hae omnes positiones a Philosopho sufficienter improbatae sunt.”.

\(^88\) \textit{Ibid.} (p. 314): “Moderni etiam in has duas vias dividuntur. Quidam enim ponunt materiam illam primam totam sub una forma creatam.”.

\(^89\) \textit{Ibid.} (p. 315): “Et ideo, tenendo viam aliorum sanctorum, qui ponunt successionem in operibus sex dierum, videtur mihi dicendum quod prima materia fuit creata sub pluribus formis substantialibus, et quod omnes formae substantiales partium essentialium mundi in principio creationis productae sunt”.

\(^90\) \textit{Ibid.} (p. 314): “[…] Ne in antiquum errorem labi videantur, ponunt illam formam non esse unum quatuor elementorum, sed aliquid quod se habet in via ad ea, ut imperfectum ad perfectum; sicut forma embrionis se habet ad animal completum”.

was originally created under only one substantial form, viz. the form of corporeity; further determinations would have been added later, in order to allow the distinction of corporeal beings into genera and species\(^92\).

As we have said, Aquinas refutes both theses. In rejecting the first he focuses on the kind of primordial enmattered form suggested, leaving open for the moment the possibility of a pluralist solution. But in discussing the second he specifically criticizes the metaphysical pluralism the option entails. (i*) Against the quidam postulating the existence of some pre-elemental form, Aquinas formulates two replies: the first is an argument from authority, invoking both Averroes and Avicenna\(^93\); the second is an empirical demonstration that the elemental form is actually the very first formal determination matter can receive, so that matter cannot derive but from such a form its simplest level of actuality\(^94\). (ii*) Against Avicebron’s opinion, Avicenna’s authority is invoked\(^95\). According to the latter —says Aquinas—, it is by virtue of

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\(^92\) Thomas Aquinas: SSLS II, d. 12, q. 1, a. 4, sol (p. 314): “Nisi forte dicatur, secundum positionem libri Fontis vitae, esse unam primam formam, et sic in materia primo inductam fore formam corporalem communem, et postmodum formas speciales distinctas”.

\(^93\) Ibid.: “Sed hoc non potest similiter dici in elementis: quia, secundum Commentatorem, XI Metaphysic., prima habilitas, quae est in materia, est ad formam elementi. Unde non invenitur aliqua forma media inter materiam primam et formam elementi, sicut inveniuntur multa media inter materiam primam et formam animalis; quorum una alteri succedit, quousque ad ultiam perfectionem veniatur, intermedii multis generationibus et corruptionibus, ut Avicenna dicit. Et praeterea, cum tunc naturalia principia instituta fuerint, oportaret etiam nunc in naturali elementorum generatione advertere aliam formam ante formam elementi.”.

\(^94\) See Averroes: In Metaph. XI(I), c. 11, 297r bF.

only one metaphysical principle that any X is made subsistent not only as a being per se, but also as a being of a certain kind (rather than of another). This principle, unique for any X, is its substantial form, which makes X, to all intents and purposes, a complete being. As a consequence, any further supervening determination will be accidental with respect to X. His commitment to these Avicennian presuppositions leads Aquinas to pinpoint the weak spot of Avicebron’s metaphysics, specifically, by denying that such a principle could be the form of corporeity. If this were the case, any specific form would be merely accidental with respect to already full-formed substances (i.e., bodies), making them fall under accidental categories rather than natural genera and species. Moreover, within such a framework any generative process would be reducible to alteration, which is clearly not the case. Therefore, Aquinas cannot admit of corporeity as the very first form inhering in primordial matter. Although somehow apt to subsist, a so-featured primordial matter could not fill the role of substrate for essentially different bodies: already endowed with a substantial form, they could not admit of any other. In other words, there would be no room for any specific distinction among creatures.

(iii) Having rejected both modern philosophical answers to the question, Aquinas proposes his own theological solution. On his view, from the beginning matter was provided with a plurality of formal determinations, which made it apt to originate individuals specifically distinct from one another. Still, primordial matter was relatively formless, insofar as its formal determinations were not yet provided with their respective active and passive qualities. In fact, God put them into matter from the second day onwards, and such an addition completed the previous day’s work of creation, without affecting its substantial features.

In order to show the philosophical consistency of this theological solution, namely to prove that substantial forms can actually subsist separately from their respective qualities, Aquinas invokes once more the authority of Avicenna. Specifically, he refers to his theory of mixture, subscribing to it only tentatively here, by contrast with his approach in later works. According to Avicenna, once involved in mixture,

96 Thomas Aquinas: SSLS II, d. 12, q. 1, a. 4, sol (p. 315): “[...] si sustinere volumus opinionem Avicennae [...]”. For an overview of Aquinas’ doctrinal evolution concerning the ontological status of elements in mixture, see Idem:
natural elements can never be affected or substantially changed as far as their primary perfections (viz. their essential features) are concerned, but they can lose their secondary perfections, since these latter can be affected and then replaced. Therefore, the subsistence of primary perfections does not depend on the actual presence of any specific secondary perfection. As Aquinas seems to imply, the elementary forms under which primordial matter was created related to their active and passive qualities in the same way as natural elements’ primary perfections relate to their secondary perfections. Accordingly, there is nothing philosophically puzzling in the hypothesis of a partially shaped primordial matter, whose formal features were prior to and ontologically independent from their active and passive qualities.

To sum up, even if it is Gregory’s reading of Genesis that is at issue in a. 4 of his commentary on d. 12, Aquinas’ approach ends up being less exegetical one might expect. By separating the biblical notion of formless earth from the philosophical notion of prime matter, Aquinas manages not only to confirm the major points of his doctrine of matter, but also to further elaborate on some of them. On the Avicennian notion of corporeity in particular, which he manifestly does not take as implying any plurality of substantial forms, by contrast with Avicebron’s forma corporalis. Moreover, by rejecting pluralism and claiming the ontological priority of elemental forms with respect to any further level of formal determination of matter, Aquinas implicitly refuses to give prime matter any active power whatsoever or any inclination towards form whatsoever, as he will say more clearly in d. 18. As before, in this context also the role of Arabic sources is crucial. In fact, Aquinas draws on Avicenna and Averroes more than once in order to answer the main


97 Thomas AQUINAS: SSLS II, d. 12, q. 1, a. 4, sol (p. 315): “[...] elementa in mixto remanere secundum formas substantiales quantum ad primum esse, transmutari autem quantum ad secundum, scilicet quantum ad qualitates activas et passivas”.

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exegetical question. If Aquinas will substantially rethink —later in his career— his interpretation of some of the passages quoted here, his reading of some others is already clear-cut. This is the case, for example, of the Avicennian doctrine of corporeity, to which Aquinas confers no ontological value.

2.2.4 In SSLS II, d. 18, q. 1, Aquinas raises a twofold question about seminal reasons. If his ultimate concern is to maintain that God introduced them into primordial matter, Aquinas mainly focuses on the very notion of seminal reasons from an ontological perspective, in order to establish what the phrase concretely designates. The occasion for taking up the question is provided by the text he is commenting on, where the Lombard resorts to two Augustinian expressions —ratio seminalis and ratio primordialis—, without going into details about their meaning and mutual relationship. As announced in the divisio textus, Aquinas intends to remedy Peter’s omission and to show that seminal and primordial virtues do not coincide with one another. This article’s relevance to our discussion lies in the perspective within which Aquinas considers seminal reasons. His interest is mainly metaphysical, as he looks ultimately at the ontological structure of hylomorphic compounds.

Aquinas’ solution is quite complex. Very roughly speaking, having stated that there really are seminal reasons in matter and what they are, he aims at, so to say, situating them in extra-mental reality, specifically,

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99 Thomas Aquinas: SSLS II, d. 18, q. 1, a. 1, arg. 1 (p. 450): “Videtur quod inconvenienter dicatur rationes seminales materiae Deus indidisse.”.

100 See for instance Augustine: *De Genesi ad litteram*, IX, ch. 15-17, passim.

101 Thomas Aquinas: SSLS II, d. 18, q. 1, divisio textus (p. 446): “Circa primum quaeruntur tria: primo utrum corpus mulieris de costa viri factum fuerit; et quia dicitur hoc non fuisset factum active per rationes seminales, sed primordiales, secundo quae stirritur de differentia harum rationum [...]”.

102 Ibid., a. 2, sol (p. 451): “Ipsae autem virtutes in materia positae, per quas naturales effectus consequuntur, rationes seminales dicuntur”. According to Aquinas, seminal reasons are those principles that, once put into matter, enable natural forms to serve their purpose and ensure that from any natural cause
at integrating them within an Aristotelian metaphysical framework\textsuperscript{103}. The following discussion will provide only a partial account of Aquinas’ solution, and will focus on the sections dealing specifically with the essence of seminal virtues\textsuperscript{104}. Before putting forward his own view — viz. that seminal reasons are in matter as active and passive virtues\textsuperscript{105} —, Aquinas reconstructs the contemporary debate in which he takes part. The theses from which he intends to distance himself are two, actually not incompatible with one another. In both, seminal reasons are connected to the hylomorphic structure of created beings. Let us briefly review them.

(1) According to the first opinion\textsuperscript{106}, the seminal reason of any X is X’s generic form, numerically distinct from and presupposed to the acquisition of X’s specific form. By virtue of its seminal reason, X is provided with a natural inclination towards its specific form it could not have had otherwise. Both generic and specific forms enter into X’s descend, regularly and with no need of any further direct divine intervention into nature, its respective natural effects.

\textsuperscript{103} Ibid.: “[...] quid sint secundum rem seminales rationes”.


\textsuperscript{105} Thomas Aquinas: SSLS II, d. 18, q. 1, a. 2, sol (p. 453): “Rationes seminales dicuntur virtutes activae completae in natura cum propriis passivis, ut calor et frigus, et forma ignis, et virtus solis, et hujusmodi”; ibid., ad 4 (p. 454): “Sub rationibus seminalibus comprehenduntur tam virtutes activae quam etiam passivae, quae perfici possunt per agentia naturalia; sicut et in generatione animalis semen extento nomine dicitur non solum sperma, sed etiam menstruum”.

\textsuperscript{106} Ibid., sol (p. 451-452): “Quidam enim dicunt quod forma speciei non recipitur in materia nisi mediante forma generis; adeo quod est alia forma numero per quam ignis est ignis, et per quam ignis est corpus. Illa ergo forma generalis incompleta ratio seminalis dicitur: quia propter talem formam inest materiae quaedam inclinatio ad recipiendum formas specificas”.

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essence, insofar as both are substantial. This is, for instance, Richard Rufus of Cornwall’s opinion\textsuperscript{107} and later, also Roger Bacon’s\textsuperscript{108}.

(2) According to the second opinion\textsuperscript{109}, the seminal reason of any $X$ is some inchoate, incomplete form inherent in $X$’s matter: such a form exists prior to $X$ (taken as an actual compound), but has not yet been given its complete \textit{virtus agendi}, so that in order for it to emerge from matter and arrive at its own perfection, the intervention of an external agent is required. In fact, since any form must be educed from the potency of matter, if $X$’s form were not already somehow present in $X$’s matter, the generation of $X$ would consist in a violent, unnatural motion—which cannot be the case. This thesis is defended not only by Albert the Great, but also by Robert Grosseteste, Robert Kilwardby and Roger Bacon\textsuperscript{110}.

To summarize, the advocates of both theses agree not only on the formal role of seminal reasons, but also on their ontological incompleteness with respect to specific substantial form. Moreover, they agree on admitting some active potency these incomplete forms impart to matter, namely about drawing a distinction between the metaphysical notion of ‘prime matter’ and the physical notion of ‘formed matter’, viz. of the substrate of change. Aquinas acknowledges that seminal reasons are somewhat tied to substantial forms, but he is unwilling to accept the further assertions of his predecessors and contemporaries. Indeed, he calls their metaphysical assumptions into question, especially their conception of hylomorphism. While in rejecting the first option Aquinas focuses mainly on the notion of substantial form, in refuting the second

\textsuperscript{107} For a different interpretation, see Elizabeth Karger: “Richard Rufus’s Account...”, p. 187.

\textsuperscript{108} For further details, see Borgo: “Les raisons ...”, pp. 146-148.

\textsuperscript{109} Thomas Aquinas: \textit{SSLS} II, d. 18, q. 1, a. 2, sol (p. 452): “[...] Alii dicunt quod cum omnes formae, secundum Philosophum [...] ..., de potentia materiae educantur, oportet ipsas formas praeexistere in materia incomplete, secundum quandam quasi inchoationem; et quia non sunt in esse suo perfectae, non habent perfectam virtutem agendi, sed incompletam; et ideo non possunt per se exire in actum, nisi sit agens exterius quod excitet formam incompletam ad agendum, ut sic cooperetur agenti exteriori; aliter enim non est generatio mutatio naturalis, sed violenta [...]. Has ergo virtutes incompletas in materia praeexistentes rationes seminales dicunt, quia sunt secundum esse incompletum in materia, sicut virtus formativa in semine”.

\textsuperscript{110} On this thesis, see Borgo: “Les raisons ...”, pp. 150-151.
he calls specific attention to the concept of matter. His discourse has three particular targets: in addition to the notion of ‘formed matter’, the theories of the plurality of substantial forms and of the active potency of matter. The latter two were major 13th-century philosophical doctrines originating in the study of Aristotle’s texts.

Particularly relevant to the present discussion are the first three arguments Aquinas provides against the first thesis\textsuperscript{111}. The opening argument aims at the kernel of pluralism. As in his earlier discussion of the form of corporeity, Aquinas claims that there cannot be many substantial forms inhering in one single being, since any form supervening after the first would be accidental. As a consequence, if the seminal reason of any hylomorphic compound were its generic substantial form, there would be no place for any other specific determination, since the seminal reason would make the compound a complete and subsisting being (and any further substantial determination would be accidental). This brings us to Aquinas’ second argument: since any substantial form provides any compound its substantial being, every compound would admit of two substantial beings, which is impossible. It is worth noting that, once again, Aquinas grounds his claim for the unicity of substantial form on the authority of Avicenna\textsuperscript{112}, according to whom any corporeal substance is both the substance and the body it actually is by virtue of one single substantial form.

Avicenna’s authority continues to play a major role in the third argument against the pluralists. Aquinas explains a passage from

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\textsuperscript{111} Thomas Aquinas: SSLS II, d. 18, q. 1, a. 2 (p. 452): “Hoc autem non videtur esse verum: quia omnis forma quae advenit post aliquid esse substantialis est forma accidentalis [...]. Et praeterea, cum omnis forma det aliquid esse, et impossible sit unam rem habere duplex esse substantialis, oportet, si prima forma substantialis adveniens materiae det sibi esse substantialis, quod secunda superveniens det esse accidentale: et ideo non est alia forma qua ignis est ignis, et qua est corpus, ut Avicenna vult... Et si Commentator dicit in \textit{Il Metaph.} [...] genus non esse materiam, sed formam mediam inter materiam et ultimam formam; hoc non dicitur ad significandum ordinem formarum secundum rem, sed secundum rationem: quia genus quamvis significet totum, ut Avicenna dicit, significat tamen ut indistinctum, et ita propinque se habet ad rationem materiae”. On these arguments, see Borgo: “Les raisons séminales …”, pp. 148-149, 163.

\textsuperscript{112} See above, p. 64.
Averroes\textsuperscript{113} — where the Commentator seems to claim that genus does not coincide with matter, but with some intermediate form between matter and the specific form — by referring to Avicenna\textsuperscript{114}. Aquinas suggests a logical reading of Averroes’ statement, with no ontological implications. To put it differently, Aquinas takes not only Avicenna, but also Averroes as a non-pluralist. It is worth noting here that Aquinas’ interpretative point is not unwarranted, as the passage quoted from Averroes was controversial at the time\textsuperscript{115}.

Against the identification of seminal virtues with inchoate forms Aquinas formulates two arguments, both specifically aimed at one of its presuppositions: the presence of some active principle in matter as a necessary condition for it to undergo change\textsuperscript{116}. In his view, if matter were endowed with inchoate forms, it would be able to activate its passive potency by itself — which cannot be the case, given that no inanimate being can be a per se moving cause of alteration. After all, in natural generation matter is not supposed to function as an agent, but simply to provide the capacity for receiving the forms external agents

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\\textsuperscript{114} Avicenna provides philosophical reasons for comparing genus to matter and, consequently, for drawing a merely conceptual distinction between genus and species. As Avicenna would have it, genus and species both designate wholes, but in different senses: while genus describes a given whole indistinctly, such is not the case with species: cf. Philosophia prima, vol.2, tr. V, 3.6.
\\textsuperscript{116} Thomas Aquinas: SSLS II, d. 18, q. 1, a. 2 (p. 452-453): “Hoc autem verum non videtur: quia quamvis formae educantur de potentia materiae, illa tamen potentia materiae non est activa, sed passiva tantum; sicut enim ut Commentator dicit in VIII Physic., in motu locali oportet esse aliud movens et motum, ita etiam in motu alterationis [...]. Nec tamen sequitur, si in materia est potentia passiva tantum, quod non sit generatio naturalis: quia materia coadjuvat ad generationem non agendo, sed inquantum est habilis ad recipiendum talem actionem”.
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can educe from it. Matter is not required then to be endowed with any active potency. To sum up, according to Aquinas the phrase “seminal reasons” can designate neither generic nor inchoate forms. In fact, there exist neither generic substantial forms really distinct from specific ones, nor inchoate forms, since matter is devoid of any active potency and substantial forms can exist in it only completely. Therefore, seminal reasons have nothing to do either with the matter *qua* matter or with physical matter. On the contrary, they inhere in matter along with enmattered substantial form and are not ontologically prior to them\textsuperscript{117}. All of this is perfectly consistent with what emerges from the previously examined texts. However, something new appears here, namely, the contemporary philosophical debate within which early Aquinas’ doctrine of matter must be contextualized, in all its complexity and its liveliness.

3. Concluding remarks

From his commentaries on distinctions 3, 12 and 18 of Book II of the *Sentences*, it appears clearly that Aquinas’ approach to Peter Lombard’s text is quite different from those of previous theologians. Even more than Albert the Great, concerning the ontological status of matter Aquinas feels the need to take seriously the philosophical implications of a few of Peter’s claims, and to meet the philosophers on their own ground. His contribution to the contemporary debate is valuable and original. Indeed, Aquinas does not draw uncritically from the mainstream of the Arts Faculty: he is neither a pluralist nor a supporter of universal hylomorphism; moreover, he coherently endorses the thesis of matter’s passive potentiality by refusing to distinguish between physical and metaphysical notions of matter, and by refusing to attribute to matter any active power.

In addition to Aristotle, both Avicenna and Averroes play major roles in the formation of Aquinas’ thought on matter. He depends exclusively on neither. Though he explicitly opts for the views of Averroes more often than for those of Avicenna, this is not enough to allow us to label his Aristotelian doctrine of matter as mainly Averroian. In fact, Avicenna provides him with powerful philosophical instruments he often applies even when rejecting Avicenna’s opinion on a given topic. Moreover, the

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., ad 2.
texts analyzed above make it clear that, when he must choose between Avicenna and Averroes, Aquinas mainly applies an exegetical criterion to evaluate their positions: he judges them on the degree of their adherence to Aristotle’s thought and texts. In other words, it is often Aristotle who provides the yardstick for measuring Averroes and Avicenna whenever their views come into conflict. To some extent, then, he considers both complements to Aristotle. Both are almost instrumental to his early comprehension of Aristotle’s *Physics* and *Metaphysics*.

Aquinas often shows himself quite hesitant with respect to the texts of both Avicenna and Averroes: his interpretations of some of them are indeed far from definitive. His assimilation of Averroes in particular seems not yet finalized. Even here we see the possibility that Aquinas will better understand the Commentator’s views, by taking his works less as exegetical instruments than as philosophical writings. This is the case, for instance, with Averroes account of celestial matter: Aquinas will change his mind with respect to his early reading in d. 12, showing that he would come only later to a complete appraisal of its philosophical implications. It is worth noting, however, that this interpretative fluidity with respect to Averroes’ commentaries concerns not only Aquinas as an individual reader, but more generally his predecessors and contemporaries, as shown by his remarks against a pluralist reading of Averroes in d. 18.

Aquinas’ position in the contemporary debate on matter is, on the contrary, firmer. His important positions are already clear, the cornerstones of his doctrine already fixed. Aquinas mentions no one openly, yet it is clear that he is perfectly aware of the current debate and wants to situate his ideas in its broad context.

On the whole, what is absolutely remarkable is Aquinas’s ability to give voice to both ancient and contemporary interlocutors, and to use the former in order to reject the latter’s arguments. Since all this occurs in his commentary on the *Sentences*, the result is even more surprising: all the literary genres mentioned above come to some extent to a synthesis. His commentary on Lombard is an occasion not only for explaining Genesis and for closely examining Augustine’s reading of it; it also offers him the opportunity to raise further exegetical questions concerning Aristotle, and to elaborate on his doctrine of matter by involving Avicenna, Averroes, and a few contemporary philosophers. It is tempting to compare Aquinas’ text to a series of Russian dolls. But
even this similitude fails to convey adequately the perfect integration of all the various strata within\textsuperscript{118}.

**Bibliography**


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Averroes (1562c): *Sermo de substantia orbis (Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois commentariis*, t. 9), Venice: Apud Iunctas [repr. Frankfurt am Main: Minerva 1962].


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