sensible de algún objeto real, sino la materia inteligible de los objetos matemáticos. La materia inteligible es sujeto de las propiedades matemáticas de un objeto matemático, conocido por una abstracción de la forma, como se dijo arriba.

Kant ampliaría la consideración de un espacio (mental, en su caso), que era requerido para el conocimiento sensible, a todo conocimiento, incluso el metafísico. Tomás de Aquino, quien sigue a Aristóteles y a su ambigua “materia inteligible” o “intelectual”, restringen ese espacio mental, esa extensión abstracta, al ámbito matemático.

Avicebrón, aparentemente extraño a esta problemática, extiende la concepción de la materia y la forma aristotélicas a todo ámbito, incluso al de Dios, haciendo compuesta su noción, pues incluiría materia y forma. Eso constituiría, a nuestro juicio, una propuesta análoga al intento kantiano. En efecto, Kant amplía la necesidad del espacio y del tiempo a todo conocimiento, incluso al metafísico, cuyos objetos —para Tomás de Aquino— no se definen ni existen con materia. Avicebrón, pues, piensa algo semejante a Kant, pero no en el ámbito del conocimiento, sino en el de lo real, ya que exige que todo objeto, incluso Dios, posean espacio y tiempo, o, en términos aristotélicos, que contengan cierta materia, y cantidad y extensión concomitantes.

The Flight of Thought:
Two Types of Thought in Wittgenstein’s
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

Shlomy Mualem
Bar-Ilan University

But it seems to me too that there is a way of capturing the world sub specie aeternitatis other than through the work of the artist. Thought has such a way —so I believe—it is as though it flies above the world and leaves it as it is —observing it from above, in flight.


The essay claims that in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus there are two types of thought: ‘Gedanke’ and ‘sub specie aeternitatis’. Gedanke, being a logical picture, corresponds to a possible state of affairs, and to facts in the world. It pertains to the interior scope of the, limit of language, and to what can be said. Sub specie aeternitatis is a mode of thought that observes its objects ‘from outside’, and thus perceives each object as a limited-whole or as a world. It pertains to the exterior scope of the limit of language, and thus relates to the sphere of transcendent values, denoting what can only be shown.

I) Setting Up the Problem

An ancient legend tells that just before Plato died he was dreaming that he was changing into a marvelous white swan. Flying from tree to tree, this swan caused much trouble to the bird-hunters who could all see him, but none of them could shoot him down with his lethal arrow. Simmias remarked that the dream signifies that all men would
desire to catch the spirit of Plato, but none would succeed (WOODBRIDGE 31). The same, I believe, can be said about Wittgenstein’s early swan, the *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus*. And yet the very attempt to illuminate the book, being both an act of striving for clarity and an act of self-understanding, is still valid.

In my view, the attempt to elucidate the *Tractatus* should be carried out via a comprehensive interpretation of the book as a complete text. Such an interpretation, so I believe, should follow two declarations of Wittgenstein concerning the meaning of his book. The first was written in a letter to Ficker in October 1919: “My work [the *Tractatus*] consists of two parts: the one presented here plus all that I have not written. And it is precisely the second part that is the important one” (VON WRIGHT 83). In my view, this dichotomy of two parts expresses itself in the text through the gap between propositions 1-6.3751, and propositions 6.4-7; the former sets limits to meaningful utterance while the latter expresses what cannot be expressed and thus, as Russell wittily puts it, “after all, Mr. Wittgenstein manages to say a good deal about what cannot be said” (RUSSELL xxiii). This gap actually divides the *Tractatus* into two separate, yet interrelated, sections: the first deals with logic and its relation to the world of facts while the other is about the realm of transcendental values. Hence the first question is how do values and facts constitute a complete philosophical system in the *Tractatus*. The second precondition of interpretation is to follow Wittgenstein’s statement that the Showing Doctrine is the crux his book. In an often-quoted letter to Russell written on 19.8.18, Wittgenstein straightforwardly declares that

The main point [of the *Tractatus*] is the theory of what can be expressed by propositions —i.e. by language— (and, which comes to the same, what can be *thought*) and what cannot be expressed by propositions, but only shown; which, I believe, is the cardinal problem of philosophy… (*Letters to Russell* 71).

The Showing Doctrine, that manifests a severe dichotomy between what can be said in language and what cannot be said but can only be shown by language, is presented in the *Tractatus* as follows:

Propositions cannot represent logical form: it is mirrored in them.

What finds its reflection in language, language cannot represent.

What expresses *itself* in language, we cannot express by means of language.

Propositions show the logical form of reality. They display it. (*Tractatus* 4.121)

What *can* be shown, *cannot* be said (*Tractatus* 4.1212).

It is noteworthy that Wittgenstein poses the can-be-said / cannot-be-said dichotomy as “the whole sense of the book” already in his introduction. He also stresses this dichotomy as the genuine basis of every possible language in the notes dictated to G.E. Moore in Norway in April 1914, which means that already during the process of forming the system of the *Tractatus* he was preoccupied with the say/show distinction:

In order that you should have a language which can express or *say* everything that *can* be said, this language must have certain properties; and when this is the case, *that* it has them can no longer be said in that language or *any* language. (*Notebooks* 107)

So it seems unequivocal that according to Wittgenstein’s own intention the Showing Doctrine is the gist of the *Tractatus* and thus should be posed at the center of a prudent interpretation of the book. And yet there is an ongoing dispute among the *Tractatus*’ commentators over the role and the meaning of this doctrine. It might be that the difficulty stems from the fact that...
significant, the Showing Doctrine is only dimly defined in the book; in the words of Pears, "it is a baffling doctrine bafflingly presented" (PEARS 143). Besides, it might be that there are actually two types of ‘showing’ in the Tractatus: the logical-linguistic showing (Tractatus 4.12-4.1212) and the ethical-aesthetical-mystical showing (Tractatus 6.421, 6.44, 6.522). Some suggest that both kinds of showing are intimately interrelated (NIELI 116, ENGELMANN 111) while others claim that there are actually two essentially separate types of showing, the one is immanent and the other transcendent (PEARS 146, HUDSON 111-112); my following investigation will uphold the first assumption. In sum, the second key question is, how does the Showing Doctrine function as the crux of the system of the Tractatus.

Following these preconditions, I hereby undertake to try to illuminate the Tractatus as a complete text in which the Showing Doctrine plays a central role. The key for such an illumination lies, so I believe, in the following presumption: there are actually two modes of ‘thought’ in the system of the Tractatus: the first is simply called ‘Gedanke’ (‘a thought’) and the second is called ‘sub specie aeternitatis’ (‘the viewpoint of eternity’). ‘Gedanke’, being a logical picture of a fact (Tractatus 3), concerns with all that can be clearly said. On the other hand, ‘Sub specie aeternitatis’ —which, alike ethics and aesthetics (Tractatus 6.421), appears only once (Tractatus 6.45) in the text and yet plays a significant role within its system—is the act of observing an object from above, “in flight”, that concerns with what can only be shown. My argument is that the first section of the Tractatus (1-6.3751) is about the realm and nature of what can be meaningfully said and is thus mostly the scope of ‘Gedanke’, excluding the logical form of a proposition that can only be shown (Tractatus 4.12); and the second section (Tractatus 6.45-7) deals solely with the realm of what can be shown and is thus exclusively the scope of ‘sub specie aeternitatis’. In order to justify my argument I will follow Wittgenstein's advice to Ficker (October 1919): "For now, I would recommend you to read the preface and the conclusion, because they contain the most direct expression of the point of the book" (VON WRIGHT 83).

II) The Notion of ‘A Limit’

In the preface of the Tractatus Wittgenstein straightforwardly declares the aim and the scope of the book:

Thus the aim of the book is to draw a limit to thought, or rather—not to thought, but to the expression of thoughts: for in order to be able to draw a limit to thought, we should have to find both sides of the limit thinkable (i.e. we should have to be able to think what cannot be thought).

It will therefore only be in language that the limit can be drawn, and what lies on the other side of the limit will simply be nonsense (Tractatus preface).

The notion of ‘a limit’ is the core of this segment. As Anscombe remarks, “the idea of the world as having limits which philosophy displays to us appears over and over again in the Tractatus” (ANSCOMBE 169), and yet this notion is rather abstruse in the book. Yet it is clear that, according to the preface, the main goal of the book is to draw a limit; and the above mentioned quotation manifests the constituent conditions of both the notion of ‘a limit’ and the act of delimitation:

1. The notion of ‘a limit’ entails two scopes, an inner space and an outer space, since it divides the whole of logical space. A limit that contains only one side is a logical contradiction. A limit must comprise two sides.

2. The act of setting up a limit, requires a preliminary a priori perception of the limit as having two sides, interior and exterior, even though the empirical content of the exterior side might be unknown. Otherwise we do not understand the logical syntax of the notion of ‘a limit’. This can be seen in Wittgenstein’s remark on the logical syntax of the notion of ‘space’, in his conversation with Moritz Schlick: “If a person never leaves his room, he nevertheless knows that there is a space beyond it in..."
there is the possibility of being outside the room (even if the walls were made of adamant). This is therefore not a matter of experience. It is *a priori* part of the syntax of space" (Vienna Circle 66). The act of delimitation is based upon an *a priori* awareness if the limit as having two sides: interior and exterior.

3. In order to be able to *conceive* the limit, we must have the ability to *think* of its both sides. If the outer side is unthinkable then the limit cannot be drawn. A *limit must comprise two thinkable sides*.

Since the limit of thought cannot be drawn, otherwise ‘we should have to be able to think what cannot be thought’, Wittgenstein turns to delineate the limits of language. A seemingly similar argument appears in propositions 4.114-4.115: that philosophy sets limits "to what can be thought; and, in doing so, to what cannot be thought. It must set limits to what cannot be thought by working outwards through what can be thought" (*Tractatus* 4.114), which will "signify what cannot be said, by presenting clearly what can be said" (*Tractatus* 4.115). It is surprising that here Wittgenstein turns over the order of his initial argument by placing thought before language, which is indeed an invalid move according to the introduction: the act of drawing a limit to thought cannot fulfill the necessary preconditions of a limitation since we cannot think of its both sides. Yet the positive aspect of this incapacity is that since Wittgenstein *does* draw a limit to language, it must conform to the above mentioned conditions: 1) the limit of language must entail two sides, interior and exterior; 2) in order to set up the limit we must have an *a priori* conception of the limit as having two sides; and 3) we must be able to *think* of them both, otherwise we should have to be able to think the unthinkable, which is logically impossible.

The mode in which the first condition is fulfilled in the *Tractatus* is quite clear: the inner scope of the limit of language is a meaningful utterance about facts while the outer scope, dealing with values and the very existence of facts, is nonsensical. Or rather, from the viewpoint of the showing/saying dichotomy, the inner space of language is all that we can *say*, while its outer space is all that can only be *shown* by language, so that the attempt to say it yields, necessarily, a nonsensical utterance. The second necessary condition posed by Wittgenstein is that we must have an *a priori* consciousness of the limit as having two sides; which leads to the third condition which is about being able to *think* of both sides of the limit. Thus the outer scope of the limit of language should be both unutterable and thinkable, as alluded in the final proposition of the book —"What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence" (*Tractatus* 7)— which manifests a scene of tacit comprehension. Since *Gedanke*, as will be demonstrated, is a logical picture of facts, and thus entails meaningful *saying*, —it turns out that there must be actually two different and complementary modes of thought in the book: the interior-scope thought (which accords with saying), and the exterior-scope thought (which accords with showing). I will try to demonstrate that the former is what Wittgenstein simply denotes as ‘*Gedanke*’ (‘thought’) whilst the latter is called ‘*Sub Specie Aeternitatis*’ (‘the viewpoint of eternity’).

III) Two Modes of Thought

The analysis of the *Tractatus* will be preceded by a short account of a segment taken from the first volume of Arthur Schopenhauer’s *The World As Will and Representation*. As Von Wright remarks in the *Biographical Sketch* (MALCOLM 5), it is most probable that Schopenhauer’s epistemological idealism did influence young Wittgenstein. As will be demonstrated, it was already Schopenhauer who represented a dichotomy of two alternative modes of knowledge and thought: the one is scientific way of thinking which subordinates to the principle of sufficient reason, and the other is the intuition of art which deals only with the knowledge of the eternal *Ideas*. Hence in clause 36 of the third section Schopenhauer writes as follows:

All these, the common name of which is science, therefore follow the principle of sufficient reason in its different forms, and their theme remains the phenomenon, its laws, connexions, and the relations resulting from these. But now, what kind of knowledge is it that considers what exists...
exist outside and independently of all relations, but which alone is really essential to the world, the true content of its phenomena...[which is] the Ideas that are the immediate and adequate objectivity of the thing-in-itself, of the will? It is art, the work of genius. It repeats the eternal Ideas apprehended through pure contemplation, the essential and abiding element in all the phenomena of the world (Schopenhauer 184).

Schopenhauer presents here a dichotomy: the first pole is scientific reason which deals with ‘the where, the when, the why, and the whither in things’ (Schopenhauer 178), that is, with phenomena in the light of the principle of sufficient reason; and the other is the artistic intuition which deals solely with the what, that is, with the Ideas which are the concretizations of the Will. Schopenhauer, then, poses two complementary modes of thought, scientific and artistic, which accord with the phenomenon/Idea dichotomy. It is interesting to note that he simply calls the former ‘science’ while he compares the latter, called ‘pure contemplation’, to Spinoza’s ‘sub aeternitatis specie’ (Schopenhauer 179), —epithets that might foreshadow Wittgenstein’s ‘Gedanke’/‘Sub Specie Aeternitatis’ dichotomy. The precedent of setting up two modes of thought is seen, then, already in the influential work of Schopenhauer.

III. 1) Analyzing ‘Gedanke’

In the light of Schopenhauer’s precedent, I will turn back to the Tractatus and try to justify my argument concerning its two modes of thought. The first notion, ‘Gedanke’ (‘Thought’), appears in propositions: 3, 3.01, 3.02, 3.04, 3.05, 3.1, 3.12, 3.2, 3.5, 4, 4.002, 4.112, and 6.21. The definition of ‘Gedanke’, manifested in proposition 3, is decisive: “A logical picture of facts is a thought [Gedanke]”. This definition constitutes an interface between thought and world, as demonstrated by the following analysis:

1. A thought is a logical picture of facts (3).

2. A picture “depicts reality by representing a possibility of existence and non-existence of states of affairs” (2.01).

3. A state of affairs (a state of things) “is a combination of objects (things)” (2.01). A combination is the changing and unstable (2.0271) structure, or configuration, of a state of affairs (2.032); whilst objects make up the unalterable and subsistent (2.0271) substance of the world (2.021).

4. The totality of existing states of affairs is the world (2.04). The existence of states of affairs is called a positive fact, while their non-existence is called a negative fact (2.06). A (positive) fact, an existing states of affairs, is what is the case (2). And all that is the case is the world (1).

Gedanke, then, depicts a possibility of the existence of states of affairs; and only if the states of affairs do exist, Gedanke actually corresponds to a fact, i.e. an ontological occurrence, in the world.

Wittgenstein moves on and depicts the relation of Gedanke and language: “In a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses” (Tractatus 3.1). It turns out that a proposition expresses logical picture of facts, so that a meaningful proposition has both a meaning and a sense. Meaning (‘bedeutung’) is determined by the existence of the objects depicted by names (Tractatus 3.203). Sense (‘sinn’) is what the picture, expressed by the proposition, presents (Tractatus 2.211), so that “instead of, ‘This proposition has such and such a sense’, we can simply say, ‘This proposition represents such and such a situation’” (Tractatus 4.03). And it is essential that we can understand the sense of any possible proposition without knowing weather its meaning is true or false (Notebooks 109).

There is, then, an intrinsic connexion between the notions of ‘Gedanke’, and meaningful propositions or ‘what can be said’: they both are logically equivalent pictures of true or false states of affairs. As far as the Saying/Showing dichotomy is concerned, Gedanke
exclusively relates to the scope of what can be said, to the inner scope of the limit of language.

It is worthwhile to mention at this point Wittgenstein’s account of Gedanke in his letter to Russell (dated 19.8.19), which is a reply to Russell’s queries about the *Tractatus*:

(2) [Russell:] “…But a Gedanke (‘thought’) is a Tatsache (‘fact’): what are its constituents and components, and what is their relation to those of the pictured Tatsache?”
[Wittgenstein:] I don’t know what the constituents of a thought are but I know that it must have such constituents which correspond to the words of Language. Again the kind of relation of the constituents of the thought and of the pictured fact is irrelevant. It would be a matter of psychology to find out.

(4) [Russell:] “Does a Gedanke consists of words?”
[Wittgenstein:] No! but of psychical constituents that have the same sort of relation to reality as words. What those constituents are, I don’t know. (*Notebooks* 129-130).

Wittgenstein stresses in his reply the isomorphic resemblance of Gedanke and language. It means that logical structure is the substratum of both language and Gedanke, and thus they both manifest equivalent pictures of facts in reality. More abstractly: language, Gedanke, and fact are three equivalent manifestations of the same logical structure. This stance is the gist of the Picture Theory of the *Tractatus*.

As to the *Tractatus* as a text that comprises two sections, it could have been argued in the light of the analysis of Gedanke that the first section of the book (1-6.3751) deals only with the realm of what can be said and is thus exclusively the scope of ‘Gedanke’. Yet there is one exception: the logical form of the proposition can only be shown and thus cannot, on no account, pertain to Gedanke, as manifested in 4.12:

Propositions can represent the whole of reality, but they cannot represent what they must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it—logical form.

In order to be able to represent logical form, we should have to be able to station ourselves with propositions somewhere outside logic, that is to say outside the world.

It turns out that every meaningful proposition contains an implicit tension. On the one hand, it says something in that it manifests a possible fact, thus it genuinely pertains both to Gedanke and to what-can-be-said. And yet on the other, it is based upon logical form, which necessarily exceeds saying and Gedanke and can only be shown (*Tractatus* 4.121)—a fact that is the main point of the Showing Doctrine. I have thoroughly dealt with this tension elsewhere (*MUALEM Tópicos*), yet here I will confine myself to stating the gist of my argument: in the *Tractatus*, so I claim, every meaningful proposition is a twofaced phenomenon that explicitly says while implicitly shows. This claim is based upon Wittgenstein’s remark in 3.42:

A proposition can determine only one place in logical space: nevertheless the whole of logical space must already be given by it...

(The logical scaffolding surrounding a picture [in the proposition (*Notebooks* 36e)] determines logical space [= the scope of the world according to *Tractatus* 1.13: “The facts in logical space are the world.”]. The force of a proposition reaches through the whole of logical space (*Tractatus* 3.42).

The tension here is between two dimensions of the logical structure of the proposition. The explicit dimension is that a proposition determines one logical place in logical space—which stands for a particular fact in the world that can be meaningfully said and hence pertains to Gedanke. On the other hand, the implicit dimension is that a proposition reaches through the whole of logical space—which stands for the totality of the...
shown, and hence exceeds Gedanke and must, as will be demonstrated, pertain to 'sub specie aeternitatis'. Therefore it can be plausibly argued that the first section of the book (1-6.3751) explicitly pertains to Gedanke and saying, while implicitly exceeds them both.

Summing up our investigation of Gedanke, it seems clear that a Gedanke is a logical mental-picture that coincides with the logical structure of a particular and bipolar (true or false) state of affairs which, only if true, corresponds to a fact in the world. Thus Gedanke maintains an internal relation with meaningful utterance, so 'what can be thought of' accords with 'what can be said'. This is the mode of thinking that applies to the internal scope of the limit of language. As Wittgenstein straightforwardly puts it in his Notebooks (12.9.16):

Now it is becoming clear why I thought that thinking and language [Denken und Sprechen] were the same. For thinking is a kind of language. For a thought [Gedanke] too is, of course, a logical picture of the proposition, and therefore it just is a kind of proposition (Notebooks 82e).

III. 2) Analyzing 'Sub Specie Aeternitatis'

Gedanke maintains a genuine relation with meaningful utterance which pervades the internal scope of the limit of language. Yet, it was demonstrated above that the notion of 'a limit' also entails an external scope which can indispensably be thought of. Gedanke pertains to, and only to, the inner scope; hence it cannot apply to the outer scope of language. So how could the latter be thought of? We seem to need a complementary and different mode of thought at this point, in order to illuminate the whole system of the Tractatus.

In my view, Wittgenstein turns to probe the exterior scope, the other side of the limit, in the final propositions of his book (6.4-7). In 6.4 he deals with the equal value of all meaningful propositions, and he proceeds as follows:

The sense of the word must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen: in it no value exists —and if it did exist, it would have no value.

If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the case. For all that happens and is the case is accidental.

What makes it non-accidental cannot lie within the world, since if it did it would itself be accidental.

It must lie outside the world. (Tractatus 6.41)

Wittgenstein presents a severe internal/external distinction so that the dichotomy is that of facts versus values. Facts are all that actually happens within the world. Values are: "the meaning of life, the meaning of the world" which "we can call God" (Notebooks 73e); ethics and aesthetics (Tractatus 6.421); "the will in so far as it is the subject of ethical attributes" (Tractatus 6.423); "the solution of the riddle of life in space and time" (Tractatus 6.4312); and the existence of the world which is the mystical (Tractatus 6.44).

Values, then, reside beyond the limits of meaningful language, hence "There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical" (Tractatus 6.522). From the viewpoint of the Showing Doctrine it can be determined that values cannot be said but can only be shown.

But how could value, a transcendental and unspoken entity, be thought of? As I mentioned above, Gedanke cannot apply to transcendental entities. So how can we think of those "things that make themselves manifest"? I suggest that Wittgenstein upholds a second mode of thought, besides Gedanke, which is actually presented in the book only once: "To view the world sub specie aeternitatis is to view it as a whole —a limited whole" (Tractatus 6.45). The essence of this supplementary mode of thought might be illuminated by a section driven from the Notebooks (dated 7.10.16):
The work of art is the object seen sub specie aeternitatis; and the good life is the world seen sub specie aeternitatis. This is the connexion between art and ethics.

The usual way of looking at things sees objects as it were from the midst of them, the view sub specie aeternitatis from outside.

In such a way that they have the whole world as background.

Is this it perhaps—in this view the object is seen together with space and time instead of in space and time?

Each thing modifies the whole logical world, the whole of logical space, so to speak.

(The thought forces itself upon one): The thing seen sub specie aeternitatis is the thing seen together with the whole logical space (Notebooks 83c).

In the first proposition Wittgenstein relates the notion of ‘sub specie aeternitatis’ to ethics and aesthetics, that is, to the transcendental scope’s ‘things’. It is also clear that sub specie aeternitatis is a mode of observation, i.e., a cognitive activity, rather than some sort of feeling or experience. In the second proposition Wittgenstein confronts two alternative modes of looking at things, the usual way that observes objects ‘from the midst of them’ versus ‘sub specie aeternitatis’ that observes objects ‘from outside’. In my interpretation, this dichotomy stands for two complementary modes of thought, Gedanke and sub specie aeternitatis. In the last four propositions Wittgenstein tries to illuminate the essence of ‘sub specie aeternitatis’ and the main point is that it perceives the object as a limited-whole rather than within the context of its relations to other objects in space and time. As Wittgenstein sharply puts it, “As a thing among things, each thing is equally insignificant; as a world each thing is equally significant” (Notebooks 83c); each particular object seen from this viewpoint is perceived as a world. This view accords with Tractatus 6.45.

It is noteworthy that in 1930 Wittgenstein repeats this stance when he probes the nature of theatrical representation. He proceeds and straightforwardly depicts the view ‘sub specie aeternitatis’ as a mode of thought:

But it seems to me too that there is a way of capturing the world sub specie aeternitatis other than through the work of the artist. Thought has such a way—so I believe—it is as though it flies above the world and leaves it as it is—observing it from above, in flight (Culture and Value 5e).

There are, then, two complementary modes of perceiving the world: the first is inductively setting up a logical picture of each particular fact so that “the totality of true thoughts is a picture of the world” (Tractatus 3.01)—i.e. Gedanke. And the other is deductively ‘to observe it from above, in flight’ as a limited whole, all at once, i.e., sub specie aeternitatis. Now this ‘flight of thought’ ‘leaves the world as it is’: it cannot produce meaningful utterance since it doesn’t deal with bipolar facts; it rather tacitly gazes at what shows itself. As Wittgenstein remarks in the Tractatus, this observation is accompanied with the feeling of the mystical: “Feeling the world as a limited whole—it is this that is mystical” (Tractatus 6.45).

In the light of the analysis of thought as sub specie aeternitatis, it seems conspicuous that this mode of observation belongs to the exterior scope of language and that it relates to those ‘things’ that show themselves. It is as though thought flies above them and observes them in silence, from above. Maybe this is what Wittgenstein means when he advises his reader to climb up beyond the propositions of his book and see the world aright (Tractatus 6.54): the reader is supposed to transcend his mode of thinking from Gedanke to sub specie aeternitatis. And still, the relation between sub specie aeternitatis and the logical form of a proposition should be unfolded. It was demonstrated during the analysis of Gedanke that a proposition is a double-dimensioned phenomenon which, according to 3.42, explicitly determines only one place in logical space while implicitly the whole of logical space must be given by it.
Now since ‘logical space’ is the scope of logic, which “pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its limits” (Tractatus 5.61), then to conceive logical space is to conceive the world as a limited-whole, which pertains to, and only to, sub specie aeternitatis (Tractatus 6.45). Therefore, the implicit dimension of a proposition, logical form, can only be shown and accordingly can only be observed by sub specie aeternitatis. It is significant to realize that conceiving a proposition requires both Gedanke in its explicit level and sub specie aeternitatis in its implicit one.

IV) Conclusion: Two Modes of Thought

The Tractatus aims at setting up a limit to language. The act of delimitation must conform to the following preconditions: 1) the limit of language must entail two sides, interior and exterior; 2) in order to set up the limit we must have an a priori conception of the limit as having two sides; and 3) we must be able to think of them both, otherwise we should have to be able to think the unthinkable, which is logically impossible. Since there are an interior scope and an exterior scope to the limit of language, there must be two complementary and different modes of thought which can apply to them: Gedanke and Sub Specie Aeternitatis.

It was demonstrated above that a Gedanke is a mode of thought that, being a logical picture, corresponds to a possible state of affairs in the world and that it only applies to the sphere of facts. It corresponds to meaningful propositions which are, too, equivalent logical pictures of true or false states of affairs. On the other hand, sub specie aeternitatis is a mode of thought that observes things from above and perceives its object as a limited-whole or as a world. Thus it relates to the sphere of transcendent values and it is accompanied by the mystical feeling.

As for the Showing Doctrine, Gedanke deals with what can be said about a fact in the world, so that it corresponds with propositions that maintain both sense and meaning. Complementarily, sub specie aeternitatis relates to what shows itself and cannot be said, such as transcendent values or the existence of the world.

Concerning the Tractatus as a complete text presenting a cohesive philosophical system, it can be plausibly argued that the book deals with drawing the limits of meaningful language so that it comprises two complementary sections. The first section (1-6.3751) relates to the interior scope of the limit, to what can be said, and thus pertains to Gedanke (except for logical form); whilst the second section (6.4-7) relates to the exterior scope of the limit, to what can only be shown, and thus pertains to sub specie aeternitatis. It turns out that the dichotomy of Gedanke vs. sub specie aeternitatis constitutes an interpretation of the Tractatus as a whole philosophical system, as a complete text.

Bibliography


Woodbridge, J.E. *The Son of Apollo*. Boston: 1929


